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Justice for Women.* 
Percy B. Lehning I
A RESPONSE TO EDWARD E. SAMPSON 
The main points of Sampson's critique against Lehning (1990) are 
summarized by Sampson in the following way: 
By failing to deal with the postmodern challenge to the Enlightenment-liberalist 
conception of neutrality and by thoroughly ignoring the feminist understanding in 
which neutrality actually conceals a masculinist bias, Lehning's analysis is seriously 
undermined with respect o its possibility for understanding, let alone for accom- 
plishing justice. (Sampson, 1994, Abstract) 
My response is based on these points of critique. 
Feminism and Postmodernism 
The precise character of the relationship between feminist heory and 
postmodernism is a subject for debate. Postmodernism ay have a great 
deal to offer to feminism but "almost all [feminist theorists] also agree that 
there are some serious problems with the relationship between the two" 
(Hirschmann, 1992, p. 300). 
Any number of anthologies on this subject support this claim (see, 
for instance, Benhabib and Cornell, 1987). The question is: Can feminism 
become postmodernist and claim to develop a theory in the interest of 
women's emancipation? Benhabib remarks, after an analysis of Flax's 
Thinking Fragments (1990) [a book used by Sampson to support his own 
claims]: "The postmodern position(s) thought hrough to their conclusions 
may eliminate not only the specificity of feminist heory but place in ques- 
tion the very emancipatory ideals of the women's movement altogether" 
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(Benhabib, 1992, p. 213). Hartsock (1990) even remarks that "postmod- 
ernism represents a dangerous approach for any marginalized group to 
adopt" (p. 16). For Hirschmann (1992) there cannot be a feminist post- 
modernism, only a postmodern feminism that can borrow from certain in- 
sights of postmodern theories. It can help feminist political theorists to 
develop their arguments on sexual difference and the need to attend to 
context and particularity (p. 318). 
In conclusion, notwithstanding these different opinions, there is evi- 
dently no doubt in Sampson's mind about the character the relationship 
between feminism and postmodernism should have. In that regard it is 
striking to note that he makes no reference whatsoever to this debate be- 
tween feminist theorists on this question. 
Liberalism and Difference 
The feminist-difference issue is, according to Sampson, a problem in 
my work. On the problem of representing differences, Gould (1993) has 
written: 
It has become a commonplace in political theory to criticize liberalism for its ab- 
stract universality and abstract individualism, in which differences other than those 
of political opinion are ignored or overridden and assigned to the private sphere. 
. . . .  But the neglect of difference in liberalism should not be exaggerated. (p. 1) 
One should add that it has, nowadays, become fashionable to write of ear- 
lier traditions as insufficiently attentive to difference and too much preoc- 
cupied with ideals of equality that require us to be, or become, the same. 
As Phillips (1993) has summarized: 
Feminist writing in the 1980s often regarded their own previous incarnations in this 
light, and argued that an exclusive mphasis on sexual equality was requiring women 
to replicate male models of democracy or employment or justice or rights. Liber- 
alism turned out to a favourite target of attack, and both feminist and socialist 
have regarded it as a tradition that erases difference--not in reality, of course, but 
in thought. Liberal political theory is said to assert an essential sameness of con- 
dition that overrides the differences between us, appealing to a natural equality in rights 
or the possession of reason that will stop these differences from counting. (p. 2) 
It is possible, however, with only a minor change of emphasis to view lib- 
eralism as founded on the very pertinence of difference as Phillips herself 
has noted. 
Instead of describing it as overriding difference, we might equally well see liberalism 
as pursuing an essential sameness of condition in order to underwrite the very real 
differences between us . . . .  [Liberalism] is driven precisely by what it seems as the 
power and the tensions of difference. Notions of diversity and difference then ap- 
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pear central to liberalism from its inception and to liberal democracy throughout 
its formation. (p. 3) 
I, of course, do not claim that these ideas have been realized in practice. 
The point is that there is, contrary to Sampsons's uggestions, nothing 
"phallocentric" in this liberal democratic framework. On the contrary, I
agree with Mendus (1992) who in an essay on feminism and democracy 
has suggested that difference is the rationale for democracy. To make this 
point clear it is necessary to make a distinction between two levels of demo- 
cratic interest: the principle of inclusion and the principle of equality. At 
the first level, difference should be ignored. Differences of class, race, and 
gender should not matter when deciding on citizenship. At the second level 
these differences hould be recognized, but not eliminated. 
For whereas traditional democratic theory tends to construe difference as an ob- 
stacle to the attainment of a truly democratic state, feminist theory should alert us 
to the possibility hat difference is rather what necessitates he pursuit of democracy. 
(Mendus, 1992, p. 216) 
In conclusion, Sampson in much too eager to reach the conclusion 
that liberal political theory and liberal democracy are unable to deal in an 
adequate way with differences. He, in fact, would have a hard time con- 
vincingly arguing so. 
J us t i ce  and  D i f fe rence  
The feminist-difference issue that is claimed to be a problem in my 
work also--according to Sampson--permeates my ideas on justice. Is this 
indeed the case? 
In regard to "diversity and democracy" and the problem of repre- 
senting differences, Gould (1993) has remarked that an alternative theo- 
retical framework in which differences would be adequately recognized and 
effectively taken into account in the public domain, remains undeveloped 
and problematic (p. 2) Taking differences eriously in the social and po- 
litical domain means taking rights seriously. It involves a conception of 
rights and justice that are not  difference-blind in its principles of equal 
rights mandating a sameness of treatment, but it involves principles that 
build a recognition of difference and the protection of the rights of differ- 
ence into its basic conception. 
Rawls's (1993) theory is an example of a theory that tries to do just 
this, as I argued in Lehning (1990). This theory acknowledges difference 
as a concern for justice. Differentiation is built into the basic requirement 
of just treatment. Justice as equal freedom should not entail only the nega- 
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tive liberties and equal political fights but also equal rights to the condition 
of differentiated self-development, positive freedom, z 
The critique that I developed with regard to Rawls's conception of 
primary goods had to do with the fact that justice requires not the same 
conditions for each other, but equivalent conditions determined by basic 
capabilities. Because justice entails a recognition and consideration of rele- 
vant differences, I argued that we should replace Rawls's conception of 
primary goods by Sen's conception of basic capabilities. We would then be 
more able to capture the realization of positive freedom and differences 
would be better recognized. 
In conclusion, Sampson has not shown at all that the theory of justice 
that is developed in Lehning (1990) is indifferent o differences; they are 
not overridden or stopped from counting. 
Capabilities and Difference 
Sampson (1994) is so obsessed with trying to make his point about 
the feminist challenge to all conceptions of neutrality, that his critique takes 
a strange turn, not to say a malign one, when we come to the point of 
"basic capabilities." He claims he first became aware that the feminist-dif- 
ference issue was a problem in my work when I 
listed the fundamental kinds of diversity that mark the human being, including dif- 
ferences based on metabolic rates, physical conditions, longevity, health, body size, 
temperament, and so forth, but excluding (by omission) sex. Lehning uses these 
differences toillustrate why state neutrality is so important to ensure just allocations 
(p. 150) . . . .  Now, while Lehning's list accurately describes some of the various 
ways in which people differ from one another; and while Lehning is correct to note 
that these are the very differences that can enter significantly into just allocations, 
by omitting sexual differences from the list, he avoids confronting the feminist challenge 
to all conceptions of neutraliO, and so can be lulled into sustaining a belief in state 
neutrality [emphasis added]. (p. 150) 
This is really an absurd point of critique. The implication is that I, on pur- 
pose, omitted sexual differences from the list to avoid the feminist chal- 
lenge. Let us get the record straight. 
I have argued in Lehning (1990) that Sen criticizes Rawls's approach 
of primary goods because Rawls does not cope in an effective way with 
the problem of the fundamental diversity of human beings. The availability 
of an adequate range of options derives its value from the contribution it
2See also Gould (1988). She proposes principles of justice that builds a recognition of 
difference and the protection of the fights of difference into its basic conception. She 
recognizes that Rawls also incorporates an acknowledgment of difference as a concern of 
justice, e.g., in his difference principle. She notes, however, that this acknowledgment is not 
as comprehensive as the one she herself proposes. 
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makes to the equal freedom of each person to lead a good life of his own 
choice. As I wrote: "In this perspective the recognition of the fundamental 
diversity of human beings has very deep consequences" (p. 307). I went 
on quoting Sen (1988) which I shall do again: 
A theory of freedom has come to grips with the enormous heterogeneity of human 
beings in terms of personal, social and natural characteristics. The crucial issue in 
identifying the nature of 'freedom of choice' relates to the question: Choice of what? 
(p. 278) 
Anyone who wants to argue that sexual differences are not included in this 
conception of freedom and choice, places himself outside the range of a 
reasonable debate on the implications of the idea of basic capabilities. 
(And, for that matter, on the implications of political neutrality.) But my 
saying so may not be convincing enough. I quote Sen (1990) himself when 
he discusses his conception of basic capabilities: "Variations related to sex, 
age, genetic endowments, and many other features give us unequal powers 
to build freedom in our lives even when we have the same bundle of goods" 
(p. 121). 
Evidently it is necessary to point out to some that, in fact, in Sen's 
approach, where abilities to take action, and not resources, are the primary 
goods, we can take account of the fact that individuals have varying needs 
for resources, in accordance with their social and physical circumstances, 
the special obstacle~ they face, and so forth. It is from that perspective 
that Sen discusses, for instance, the empirical issues involved in the variable 
conversions of primary goods (and resources) into capabilities (and free- 
dom) with respect o Indian women. 
Okin (1989) has argued convincingly in Justice, Gender, and the Family 
that, for a number of reasons, the division of labor that prevails between 
the sexes is a matter of social injustice. It often leads to economic, psy- 
chological, or even physical vulnerability of women and children. It con- 
tributes to women's inequality of opportunity and actual inequality of power 
and influence in society at large. I must admit that I really cannot see that 
only a postmodern feminist point of view can lead to this insight. Even 
less is it clear to me why the concept of "basic capabilities" would not be 
a way to deal with these problems. It is, then, from this perspective, the 
perspective of "functioning and capability" that one should understand 
Serfs and, one should add, Nussbaum's development e hic. (For an insight- 
ful analysis of Nussbaum's and Sen's development e hic, see Crocker, 1992.) 
It is from this perspective that the contributions to, for instance Human 
Capabilities: Women, Men and Equality (Nussbaum and Glover, 1993) are 
written. (See also Nussbaum, 1992; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993.) 
In conclusion, there is no reason whatsoever not to include sexual 
differences in the list of ways in which people differ, and certainly not from 
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the perspective of justice that has been defended in Lehning (1990). 3Con- 
trary to what Sampson suggests, these differences where not at all omitted 
in Lehning (1990) "to avoid the feminist challenge." 
Impartiality and Difference 
Sampson may claim that I have missed the core of his critique. He 
may want to argue that it is not directed against he conception of basic 
capabilities as such, or against justice as such, but its target is the concep- 
tion of neutrality I use. That conception ,'actually conceals a masculinist 
bias," and: "the disturbing feature of the Enlightenment-liberalist project, 
Lehning's included, [is] its clearly masculinist bias hidden under the guise 
of neutrality" (Sampson, p.148). And 
Much of the feminist critique of neutrality is built upon its theory of sexual differ- 
ences. The feminist theory of difference argues that state neutrality is not simply 
and idle myth surviving from the Enlightenment, but serves to conceal the partiality 
that inheres in the very belief in impartiality. (p. 149) 
Let us first recapitulate. I wrote that the 
central argument favoring the liberal notion of neutrality is that it is necessary if
one acknowledges that there exist a variety of conceptions of the good life. There 
are many ways in which a fulfilled life can be lived, without any perceptible hier- 
archy among them. (Lehning, 1990, p. 188) 
And: 
The stress upon neutrality and equal respect, which denies the state any right to 
implement any specific conception of the good life, emphasizes the equal freedom 
that all persons should have to pursue their own conception of the good life. (p. 
189) 
The public role of a neutrally recognized political conception of jus- 
tice is to specify a point of view from which all citizens can examine before 
one another whether or not their political institutions are just. It has been 
my contention that Rawls's conception of justice is, in fact, an example of 
such a political conception of justice. This contention is based on the idea 
that the way Rawls has formulated his conception of justice is founded on 
the ideal of impartial moral reason. 
Now for instance Young (1990) has argued (with reference to Rawls's 
theory) that the ideal of impartiality is an impossibility, and that it denies 
difference. (I follow here Young, 1990. On this point Sampson's argument 
is essentially the same as that of Young,) In fact, she claims that the ideal 
~I'his of course does not imply that the conception of basic capabilities, as an alternative to 
Rawls's primary goods is immune against criticism. See for a reaction on Sen's ideas, Rawls 
(1993, pp. 182-186). See also Daniels (1990). 
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of impartiality in moral theory expresses a logic of identity that seeks to 
reduce differences to unity (p. 97). This conception of moral reason as- 
sumes that 
in order for the agent to escape egoism, and attain objectivity, he or she must 
adopt a universal point of view that is the same for all rational agents. The ideal 
of impartiality is the result of this search for a universal, objective "moral point of 
view." (pp. 99-100) 
In sum, Young's argument is that impartial reason aims to adopt "a point 
of view from nowhere," and therefore denies difference. I suggest, however, 
that impartial reason does not take a point of view from nowhere but, on 
the contrary, a perspective from which allpoints of view are taken seriously, 
with the purpose of taking into account all differences. 
It is, of course, the function of Rawls's well-known device of the 
"Original Position" to do just this. The "veil of ignorance" guarantees im- 
partiality when principles are formulated that should regulate the basic 
structure of society. Hypothetical people in selecting principles of justice 
are deprived of knowledge of their own particular place in society, their 
class, occupation, sex, and so forth, and therefore have to consider the well- 
being of everyone, from the best-off to the worst-off, on the hypothesis that 
they could be any one of them. 
In conclusion, contrary to what Young (1990) and Sampson (1994) 
claim, impartiality does not do away with difference. I agree with Nussbaum 
(1992, p. 45) and Okin (1989, p. 101) that the exercise of impartial moral 
imagination is enormously valuable for understanding the lives of, for in- 
stance, women, and that Rawls's theory of justice can be a tool for feminist 
criticism. 
Neutrality and Difference 
Sampson claims that one of the reasons I have made a choice in favor 
of neutrality is that "If there is no neutral place to stand, we worry that 
there will be no way to choose among competing views, no fair way to 
allocate resources" (p. 147). And he continues to remark that 
The choices are not between eutrality or death, chaos or madness, but rather be- 
tween neutrality and the need for people to operate together, in full knowledge of 
their interests and situatedness, to probe and to negotiate the terms by which they 
will live together imperfectly in this world of their differences. (pp. 147-148) 
I, for my part, certainly have not claimed that the choice is death or neu- 
trality. But there is more to it. The choice is not between, on the one hand, 
neutrality and, on the other, the need for people to cooperate together in 
full knowledge of their interests and situatedness. The question is how to 
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achieve this cooperation. The upshot of my article has been to show that 
neutrality is a plausible basis for this "negotiation" if it is to be on the 
basis of reason rather than superior force. The best we can say of Samp- 
son's critique is that he has misinterpreted the ideal of "neutrality" and 
"the neutral state" as developed in Lehning (1990) or has been misled by 
the term neutrality. 
Let us try, once again, to make clear the argument on which the idea 
of neutrality has been based. The starting point for using the concept neu- 
trality was Rawls's idea of political iberalism. The central aim favoring the 
liberal notion of neutrality is that it is necessary if one acknowledges that 
there exists a variety of conceptions of the good life. In response to this 
variety, to pluralism and reasonable disagreement political liberalism for- 
mulates the principle that the state should be neutral with respect o this 
diversity of conceptions of the good life. 
Neutrality can be defined in quite different ways. As Rawls (1993) 
has noted: "[S]ome forms of liberalism are neutral in the sense that they 
use no ideas of the good at all except ones that are purely instrumental 
(neutral means, as it were) . . . .  [J]ustice as fairness is not neutral in this 
way . . . .  " (p. 191, note 22). The Rawlsian principles of justice are sub- 
stantive. The principles express far more then procedural values, and so do 
its political conceptions of society and person, which are represented in 
the original position. Justice as fairness, then, is not procedurally neutral. 
A different way of defining neutrality is neutrality of aim. In Lehning 
(1990) it has been used in this way. There neutrality has been defined in 
terms of the aim of basic institutions and public policy with respect o com- 
prehensive doctrines and their associated conceptions of the good. Neu- 
trality of aim (as opposed to neutrality of procedure) "means that those 
institutions of society and policies are neutral in the sense that they can 
be endorsed by citizens generally as within the scope of a public concep- 
tion" (Rawls, 1993, p. 192). This neutrality of aim is not to be confused 
with neutrality of effects or influences. Following Rawls (1993) it should be 
noted that 
it is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just constitutional regime not to 
have important effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure 
and gain adherents over time; and it is futile to try to counteract these effects and 
influences, or even to ascertain for political purposes how deep and pervasive they 
are. We must accept the facts of commonsense political sociology. (p. 193) 
Recapitulating, procedural neutrality should be distinguished from 
neutrality of aim; the latter should not be confused with neutrality of effect 
or influence. Justice as fairness hopes to satisfy, as Rawls mentions, neu- 
trality of aim in the sense that basic institutions and public policy are not 
to be designed to favor any particular comprehensive doctrine. Political 
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liberalism abandons, however, as impracticable neutrality of effect or in- 
fluence. 4 [One could add that recently Rawls (1993, p. 194) noted that the 
term neutrality is unfortunate because some of its connotations are highly 
misleading, others suggest altogether impracticable principles uch as neu- 
trality of effect, a idea strongly suggested by the term itself. It is a reason 
for avoiding the term.] 
A clear example of misunderstanding the way the concept neutrality 
is used, is evident from the following remarks of Sampson (1994) 
Tax laws, of course, do deal directly with allocation decisions and should thereby 
provide us (and Lehning) with a prime case of state neutrality. And yet, as we all 
know, there is no way to devise tax legislation that does not advantage some and 
disadvantage others. Neutrality here . . ,  is a myth that serves some interests over 
others. (p. 149) 5 
Sampson is quite right in stating that tax laws deal with allocation [or, as 
I rather would say, with (re-) distribution] decisions. The implication of his 
remark is that, by making such decisions tate neutrality is a mirage. Tax 
legislation always advantages some and disadvantages others. 
I will not argue that this is not what, in fact, tax law does. The ques- 
tion is if this is a proof of the myth of the conception of state neutrality 
as that conception has been used in my article. I would say it is not. Let me 
elaborate. The point is not at all whether tax legislation advantages some 
and disadvantage others. In that sense Sampson's feminist example is be- 
side the point, since it actually appeals to premises about equal treatment 
that a neutralist would accept. The point is rather to design tax laws that 
advantage and disadvantage persons in a way that is in line with principles 
of justice. This is what Rawls's "difference principle" is supposed to do. It 
is a principle that is especially relevant for the design of tax laws. As part 
of the Rawlsian conception of political liberalism the difference principle 
is part of the basic institutions of society and policies. This principle should 
also be endorsed by each citizen because it is neutral with regard to con- 
ceptions of the good life that citizens are persuing. 
This does not mean, however, that the application of the difference 
principle works out the same for everybody. The purpose of the difference 
principle is to guarantee that inequalities in, for instance, income work out 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. It may 
be the case that the difference principle requires a design of tax laws which 
4It should be emphasized that neutrality in aim does not mean that political liberalism may 
not affirm the superiority of certain political virtues. Justice as fairness thus includes the 
virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness 
and the sense of fairness. See Rawls (1993, p. 194). 
5See also Young (1990): "The idea of neutrality that stands above the particular interests and 
conflicts of civil society is, however, a myth" (p. 114). 
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have as effect hat some have to pay more tax and some have to pay less 
because the aim is reaching a situation of equal concern and respect for 
everybody or, to formulate it in another way, a situation of equal basic 
capabilities. The burden of taxation is to be justly shared, but as with the 
right to equal protection which may require an unequal distribution of po- 
lice over different neighborhoods, a just tax legislation may require that 
some have to pay more than others. 
In conclusion, from my part it would be rather preposterous to drop 
right now the term neutrality as a rebuttal to Sampson's critique. The im- 
portant point to note is, however, that the use of the term neutrality, which 
I have tried to make more clear above, should not have been interpreted 
to mean indifference to differences, as Sampson claims. On the contrary, 
the liberal notion of neutrality should guarantee that differences will be 
taken care of in such a way that each citizen, male or female, hetero- or 
homosexual, will be treated with equal concern and respect. 
Feminism and Justice 
Sampson is of the opinion that the kind of constitutive sense of per- 
sonhood that Sandel (1982) recommended, and that according to Sampson 
(1994, p. 153) is the centerpiece of the postmodern feminist analyses, better 
fits the understanding of justice then the one I have given. I am not so 
sure, for several reasons. Let me mention just one. One aspect of Sanders 
arguments, to insist that families be internally just, is misguided. The family 
is according to him, "beyond justice" and not an appropriate topic for a 
theory of justice. Okin (1989, Chap. 2) questioned this position, especially 
when we notice whose interest he ideas of love beyond justice has fre- 
quently served. Sandels's theory is in that sense not gender-neutral t all. 
At the same time as ignoring families, theories like Sandel's assume, as 
Okin has noted, that meals will be cooked, houses cleaned, etc., in short 
the reproduction of people will continue. 
It is rather a surprise to discover at the end of Sampson's criticism 
of my article, that he recommends to turn to a theorist for whom the family 
is beyond justice, but who nevertheless envisions---according to Samp- 
son the postmodern feminist view of justice. 
In conclusion, I have not been very impressed by Sampson's critique. 
The question is whether there is a coherent basis for social institutions to 
be constructed from the so-called feminist-postmodernist line. If so, it does 
not emerge here (and I very much doubt if it exists). All in all, Sampson's 
antiliberal challenge misfires. This does not mean that all is well with lib- 
eralism. On the contrary. That is, however, another story. 
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